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A. Strategy-Proofness as the Market Size Grows
We now show that ifη t (the DA-IP matching in a continuum economy) is not a unique statically stable matching in a static economyF t (η t−1 ) for some t ≥ 1 then the fraction of agents who can manipulate the DA-IP mechanism does not necessarily converge to 0. In this example, we relax some of the assumptions we used in the paper to simplify the presentation. Specifically, we will not assume that the agents born in each period are distributed identically in the continuum economyF = (ν,r) to which the sequence of finite economies converges. In addition, the measure of the agents born in each period is not necessarily 1. Finally, of course in one of the periods the DA-IP matching of that period will not be a unique statically stable matching. EXAMPLE 6: There are 4 schools, s 1 , s 2 , s 3 and s 4 . Consider the following continuum economyF = (ν,r) such thatr s 1 =r s 2 =r s 3 =r s 4 = 0.25,ν(Ī 0 ) = 0, ν(Ī 1 ) = 0.5,ν(Ī 2 ) = 0.75,ν(Ī 3 ) = 0.25 and ν(Ī t ) = 0, for all t > 3. We assume that each agent's preference satisfies strong rankability. In addition,Ī 1 is partitioned intoĪ 1 1 andĪ 2 1 where ν(Ī 1 1 ) = ν(Ī 2 2 ) = 0.25. Furthermore,Ī 2 is partitioned intoĪ 1 2 ,Ī 2 2 andĪ 3 2 where ν(Ī 1 2 ) = ν(Ī 2 2 ) = ν(Ī 3 2 ) = 0.25. The preference rankings of the agents satisfies the following conditions: Observe here that the DA-IP matching in economy E k mirrors the one in the continuum economyF . However, suppose that an agent in i * ∈ I k1 2 reports a strongly rankable preference that satisfies
In this case, the DA-IP matching is as follows: As a result of this manipulation, i * definitely improves. Therefore, no matter how high k is, all the agents in I k1 2 can manipulate the DA-IP mechanism. Clearly, the percentage of the children who have a manipulation of the DA-IP mechanism stays constant for each k.
Example 6 has a very specific structure in the sense that in period 2 only one agent's false preference report leads to a matching that is significantly different from the DA-IP matching under truth telling. In other words, if the market is very big this false report leads to a very long chain of rejections and proposals in the DA algorithm. Indeed, in any randomly generated economy, we suspect that one agent's report having such a big impact is very unlikely. In this sense Examples similar to 6 is unlikely to occur in reality.
B. Algorithm to Find Attainable Matchings
We present the full version of our algorithm that find all the attainable schools. Recall that we are working with a fixed static economy (J, r) and are investigating which matchings i induce. All the agents other than i report their (isolated) preferences truthfully (as given in economy (J, r)).
We now prove Lemma 2 studied in the main text of the paper. PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
To prove this lemma it suffices to show that the DA mechanism allocates agent i to the attainable school listed highest in the submitted preference report of agent i. Let P * i be the submitted preference report of agent i. Let s * be the highest ranked attainable school in i's report. Contrary to the claim, suppose that i is not allocated to s * . Clearly, by the definition of the non-attainable schools, i cannot be allocated to any non-attainable school. Thus, i must be allocated to an attainable school that is listed after s * . However, because s * is an attainable school, the DA must allocate i to s * for some report of i * . As a result, if i's true preferences were P * i , she would have had a successful manipulation of the DA mechanism. This contradicts the strategy-proofness of the DA mechanism in static settings.
We now diverge somewhat from the material in Section 6 where for simplicity of presentation, we introduced a simpler version of our algorithm.
Fix an attainable school s and we now look for ways to find all the s-attainable matchings. Fix a set S s ⊆ S N A . For (s, S s ), we split the non-attainable schools into two groups: redundant and non-redundant. If we set S s = ∅, then the current definition of (s, S s )-redundant school is equivalent to s-redundant school defined in Section 6.
and (ii) the DA mechanism produces the same matching when i submits any two preference reports, P s i andP s i , such that 1) both rank s as the highest attainable school
2) the sets of schools ranked higher than s under P s i andP s i both contain S s , and they differ only in that the one under P s i does not contain s while the one underP s i does.
A school s is (s, S )-non-redundant if s is non-attainable and in addition, it is not (s, S )-redundant. We use the notations S R (s, S ) and S N R (s, S ) to denote the (s, S )-redundant and non-redundant schools, respectively.
Fix any S ⊂ S N A and S ⊂ S N A such that S ⊆ S . From the definition above it is clear that
For a pair (s, S s ) with s ∈ S N A and S s ⊂ S N A , we writeP s i to denote a preference report of i in which the set of schools ranked higher than s is S s . We also writeσ s to denote the DA matching when i reportsP s i .
LEMMA 9: Fix a pair (s, S s ) with s ∈ S N A and We now prove the two Lemmas that are used in the paper.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4:
As usual, for all the preference profiles we consider here, every agent except i reports truthfully. Let P andP be the preference profiles in which s and h are the most preferred schools for i respectively. Denote the corresponding DA matchings under P andP by σ andσ. It is well-known that when an agent drops out of the market, the schools are worse off, i.e, for eachs = h, By combining the above two relations with Lemma 3 we prove that s is a nonredundant school for h.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5:
Fix S ⊆ S N R (s). In all preference profiles we consider in this proof, every player's preferences are the true ones except i's. Let P 1 andP 1 be the preference profiles in which i's report ranks only the members of S andS ahead of s. Similarly, let P 2 andP 2 be the preference profiles in which i's report rank only the members of S ∪ S and S ∪S ahead of s. Denote the matching that results from P 1 andP 1 by σ. Similarly, let σ 2 andσ 2 be the DA matchings which result from P 2 andP 2 respectively. We will now show that σ 2 =σ 2 . Suppose otherwise.
We first show that σ 2 (orσ 2 ) is staticly stable underP 1 (P 1 respectively). Suppose otherwise. From Lemma 6 (in the appendix), we know that σ 2 is a stable matching under P 1 . Because P 1 andP 1 differ only in agent i's preferences, if σ 2 is not stable underP 1 , then i must be a part of any blocking pair. In addition, the schools which are not ranked ahead of s underP 1 i but not under P 1 i are those inS \ S. Thus, some school s in this set and i must block σ 2 underP 1 . In other words,
Furthermore, under P 1 , σ is the agent optimal stable matching while σ 2 is a stable matching. Thus, we find
These two relations imply that i and s must block σ underP 1 . This contradicts that σ is stable underP 1 .
We now show that σ 2 (σ 2 ) is staticly stable underP 2 (P 2 , respectively). We know that σ 2 is stable under P 2 . Because P 2 andP 2 only differ in i's preferences and the schools which are not ranked ahead of s underP 2 i but not under P 2 i are those inS \ S. Hence, some s in this set and i must block σ 2 underP 2 . At the same time, we know that σ 2 is stable underP 1 . The schools which are not ranked ahead of s underP 2 i but not underP 1 i are those in S \S. Thus, s is in S \S. But there is no common element inS \ S and S \S. Thus, σ 2 (σ 2 ) is staticly stable underP 2 (P 2 , respectively).
Finally, because σ 2 is stable andσ 2 is the agent optimal stable matching under P 2 , each agent prefersσ 2 to σ 2 . At the same time, under P 2 , this relation is reversed. Consequently, σ 2 =σ 2 . Now we are ready to present our algorithm to find all the attainable matchings under which i is allocated to the same attainable school.
The Algorithm to Find the Attainable Matchings
Fix an attainable school s. Round 0. Fix a preference report of i in which s is ranked first. Find the DA matching when i submits this preference report and M(s) be the set that consists of this matching. Find all the redundant and non-redundant schools for (s, ∅). Let S(s) be the set of all subsets of S N R (s, ∅). Call S 1 (s) = {S ∈ S(s) : |S | = 1}. Round 1. Sequentially consider sets in S 1 (s). For each S ∈ S 1 (s), fix a preference report of i in which s is the highest ranked attainable school and in which the set of schools that are ranked higher than s is S . If the DA matching corresponding to this report is already found, then eliminate all the sets containing S from S(s). If not, add the DA matching to M(s). If school s ∈ S N A is redundant for (s, S ) where S ∈ S 1 (s), then we eliminate each S ⊇ {S ∪ s } from S 0 (s). Once all the members of S 1 (s) are considered, set S 2 (s) = {S ∈ S(s) : |S | = 2}.
Round k. Sequentially consider sets in S k (s). For each S ∈ S k (s), fix a preference report of i in which s is the highest ranked attainable school and in which the set of schools that are ranked higher than s is S . If the DA matching corresponding to this report is already found, then eliminate all the sets containing S from S(s). If not, add the DA matching to M(s). If school s ∈ S N A is redundant for (s, S ) where S ∈ S 1 (s), then we eliminate each S ⊇ {S ∪ s } from S 0 (s). Once all the members of S k (s) are considered, set S k+1 (s) = {S ∈ S(s) : |S | = k + 1}.
The algorithm stops at stepk where Sk +1 (s) = ∅ and the set of the DA matchings M(s) is the one found in the last round.
We now show that M(s) resulting from the above algorithm is the set of attainable matchings under which i is matched to s.
PROPOSITION 3: Fix s ∈ S A . The algorithm above yields all the s-attainable matchings.
PROOF:
This proposition is a direct consequence of Lemmas 9 and 5. The algorithm above is more elaborate than the one in the main text of the paper but is potentially much faster. Secondly, by running the above algorithm for each attainable school, we find all the matchings that the DA mechanism delivers for various reports of i. As we noted in the paper, if there is only one hattainable match, then all the attainable matchings can be found without running the above algorithm.
C. Simulation Result
In this subsection, we report our simulation results for two cases: (i) there are twice as many agents as the total number of seats at schools and (ii) homecare is the worst option for every agent.
First, to increase competition we consider markets in which the number of agents is twice as large as the total number of seats. Otherwise, the current simulation exercise is identical to the one considered in Table 2 .
Under priorities satisfying IPA, the manipulation percentage drops significantly. There are two reasons for this: (i) competition decreases one's chance of getting into a better school significantly in the next period and (ii) half of the agents from period 1 is forced to stay home in period 0. Both of these forces reduce one's chances of manipulating. Under Danish priorities however there are two opposing forces: competition means that agents are being allocated to lower ranked schools on average, which suggests that by staying home improves one's priorities in the following period. Hence, manipulation is more likely to be successful. On the other hand, competition in unbalanced markets also forces many students out of school under truthtelling. These students will not be able to manipulate under Danish priorities. In addition, those who manipulate by staying home do not get better priority than those who are forced to stay home. This again reduces the possibility of manipulation under Danish prioirities. The opposing two forces explain why the manipulation percentages under Danish priorities in Table 3 are almost half of those in Table 2 .
In the simulations considered in Table 2 , any agent's payoff from staying home is drawn according to a uniform distribution on the [0, 1] interval. Consequently, many agents rank home ahead of some schools, which could be somewhat restrictive and affect the manipulation percentage. Thus, we repeat our simulation exercise by assuming that each agent's payoff from staying home is 0. For each combination of the number of schools and capacity, we randomly generate 10,000 markets and report the results in The percentage of markets in which an agent can manipulate indeed increased significantly under priorities satisfying IPA. The main reason behind this result is that when each agent ranks home as the worst option, the number of possible matchings an agent can induce by misreporting her preferences increases significantly. When a child ranks a school ahead of the school she obtains under truth telling, it generally leads to a sequence of rejections and new applications in the DA algorithm. When home is not the worst option, the chance that this sequence ends with some agent choosing home increases greatly. Therefore, an increase
